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PREJUDGMENT: AN UNAVAILABLE CHALLENGE TO 
OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
Charles H. Koch, Jr. * 
P ROFESSOR DAVIS URGES THAT DISCRETION, not tyra nny , necessarily takes over where law ends.
' 
It is the quality and integrity of the men who exer-
cise discretion , and not the structural framework in which it is exercised , 
which measures the fairness of administrative action ; for no structural im-
peratives can assure justice and fairness nearly so well as institutionalized 
imperatives of honesty and integrity. Moreover, structure tends to stultify the 
administrative process and substantially interfere with the equitable nature 
of its operation . 
Thus, discretion is the cornerstone of the administrative process and 
the working principle which is both its strongest point a nd its major point 
of controversy. One of the problems of the exercise of discretion is purity 
of motive. The exercise of discretion usually raises some question as to 
whether the action has been the result of a weighing of the equities in the 
particular situation or the result of preconceived notions or extraneous 
pressures. 
Consequently, a pervasive question in review of administrative decision-
making is the possibility of prejudgment. A challenge of prejudgment in an 
administrative decisionma king is invariably availa ble to a dissatisfied party . 
Unfortunately, such challenges, though rarely successful , do result in delay 
of agency action, often enough to encourage continued attempts. This article 
attempts to analyze and categorize the leading prejudgment decisions. Hope-
fully, through this analysis, agencies will learn to avoid charges of illegal 
prejudgment, a nd some prediction of the chances of success of various types 
of prejudgment challenges can be made , perhaps di scouraging certa in of the 
more frivolous challenges by the administrative law bar . 
ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES 
In order to better understand prejudgment, it is necessary to recognize 
the various forms it may take. The categories below a re inferred from judicial 
decisions and commentators' remarks. 
There are two major means of distinguishing prejudgment problems. 
First is the type of issue prejudged. The types of issues can be distinguished 
as (1) broad policy or legal theory, (2) general facts , or (3) specific facts. 2 
' Attorney, Office of the Genera l Counse l, Federa l Trade Commission . 
l D avis, DI SCRf-:TIO!'; /\RY J USTI CE : A PREUMI Nt\RY I!':Qu IR Y (1969). 
~ Professor Davi s di stingui shed facts as "legislative" and "adjudicative ": 
The ca rdi na l distinction which more than any other governs the li se of cxtra- fc(.'ord facts by COlirt s and 
agencies is the distinction bet ween legislative facts and adjudicative facts. When a court or an a~n('y finds facts 
concerning the immediate parties- wh o did w hat, where, w hen, how and with what motive or intent - the ('ourt 
or agency is performing an adj udicati ve fun f li on, and the facts are convenientl y ca lled adjudicative facts. \tVhen 
a court or an agency develops Jawor policy , it is acting legislatively; the (Ourls have <Teated the fo mmon law 
through judicia l legisla tion , and the facts which form the tribuna l's legisla tive judgment a re called legisla tive facts. 
2 DA VIS, ADMI NISTRATIV E LAW TREATISE, §I S. 03 a t 353. (H ereinafter cited as DAVIS.) 
2 18 
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The second major distinction involves the context in which the alleged 
prejudgment arises. Bias may arise either in the context of an institutional 
decisionmaking process (which may involve one or more individuals) or in a 
purely individual context. The context of the decisionmaking appears to be 
the key factor for the courts in determining whether alleged bias constitutes 
illegal prejudgment. 
DISTINCTION ON THE BASIS OF THE TYPES OF ISSUES 
A. Acceptance of Bias as to General Policy and Legal Theory 
The most pervasive type of issue bias is the prejudgment of basic 
philosophical or legal issues raised in a proceeding. Everyone recognizes 
that decisionmakers at every level possess preconceptions which affect their 
interpretation of facts and direct their decisions. This sort of prejudgment is 
never considered as grounds for overturning a decision. Judge Frank may 
have said all that is necessary: "If ... 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to 
mean the total absence of preconception in the mind of the judge, then no one 
has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will."3 
Administrative agencies are created to fill the need for decisions based 
not on legalisms but on notions of how the system should work.4 Hence, 
policy bias-broad theory prejudgments-on the part of the members of an 
agency is more than permissible, it is imperative. 
The propriety of broad theory or policy bias in administrative agencies 
is well established in the law. The Supreme Court in United States v. Mor-
ganS said, "[c]abinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory func-
tions are not assumed to be flabby creatures any more than judges are. 
Both may have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case."6 
Similarly in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, the Circuit Court said, "[W]e do not ex-
pect a Trade Commissioner to be neutral on anti-monopoly policies." 7 Ob-
viously, bias as to an "underlying philosophy" does not concern the courts. 
B. Permissible Understanding and Opinion of General Facts 
The second type of issue bias relates to general facts. For the purpose of 
this analysis, general facts are to be considered any facts which apply gener-
ally to an industry or other recognizable class. The result of the synthesis 
of these general facts with broad policy orientation or theory is the establish-
ment of a policy towards an industry or class. Indeed, broad policy and 
' In re J. P. Linaha n, Inc .. 138 F .2d 650. 65 1 (2d Cir. 1943). 
IA N EW R Et:Ul.i\ TOH Y FRAMEW OR K, R EPO RT O !\,i SELECTED b; DE PE~DE;\;T R EG C L·\TO RY AGE:\" CIES (The HAsh Com-
mission" Report ) a t 13 (197 1); TI-IE H OO \ ' ER COMMT SSIO X RE PO RT 0<'> Til E ORGA:,\IZATl Ol'\ O F THE E XECCTIV E BRA:"II CH O F 
GOV ER N MENT at 430 (1949). Also: 
" Since the members of the agency a nd the statutorily designated officers were specially selected for the fun ctions 
they were to perrorm. Congress probably reposed confidence in their experience a nd expertness. It doubtless did not 
wish to disorganize administra tion until time showed whether tha t confidence was well placed ." Wong Ya ng Sung v. 
~1 cG ra th . 339 U.S. 33. 55 ( 1950) U. Reed dissenting}. 
' 313 U.S. 409 (1941 ) (the rourth or the Morga n series). 
(' l d. at 421. 
"336 F.2d 754.764 (D .C. C ir. 1964). 
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general facts often become so clearly intertwined that they may be, in the 
final analysis , nearly indistinguishable.8 
Bias as to general facts at issue in an agency proceeding will not be 
grounds for a finding of illegal prejudgment. Professor Davis finds that 
" Prejudgment of general facts of the kind that merge with points of view 
concerning issues of law or policy is probably inevitable a nd cannot properly 
be deemed a ground for disqualification ."9 
Indeed, the notion of expertise suggests an understanding of facts gained 
from experience combined with informed predispositions. lo According to 
former Federal Trade Commissioner Elman: "Agency members .. . are ex-
pected to be experts , bringing to each case a specialized knowledge formed 
by experience. Such knowledge and experience is not, and should not be, 
confined to the record of a particular case ." II When an agency pursues an 
investigation which will muster all relevant general facts and then weighs 
these facts objectively-influenced only by opinion as to broad policy or legal 
theory- in order to reach some general conclusions, then the administrative 
process is working at its optimum.12 Retrieving knowledge or opinions of 
general facts for use in a proceeding relating to a specific party will not 
constitute prejudgment. 
A comparison of the holding in Safeway Stores, Inc., et al. v. FTC13 
with the decision in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC,I4 two nearly identical 
factua l situations, illustrates this point. In both cases, FTC Chairman 
Dixon had acted as Chief Counsel for congressional investigations of the 
respective industries before becoming Chairman of the FTC, and had in 
both cases asked hostile questions of industry witnesses. Yet, in American 
Cyanamid, but not in Safeway Stores, Chairman Dixon was disqualified. 
The Ninth Circuit in Safeway Stores distinguished the case before it from 
American Cyanamid on the basis of the depth of the Chairman's inquiry 
into specific facts which ultimately arose in the Commission' s proceeding. I S 
The Court , in the case before it , refused " .. . to hold that , on the basis of 
the questions asked of Continental ' s president . . . prior to initiation of the 
present proceedings, and not including a statement of opinion as to an 
ultimate controverted issue which he would judge, a disinterested observer 
would have reason to believe that he had prejudged the dispute. " 16 (Empha-
sis added .) Previously, the Sixth Circuit in American Cyanamid, also , found 
that inquiry into the general issues would not have led to disqualification 
and specifically limited its holding by the qualifying statement that , "[w]e 
do not hold that the services of Mr. Dixon as counsel for the subcommittee, 
standing alone , necessarily would require disqualification. Our decision is 
I\" When legis lat ive facts are used for the creation of law or poli cy, the facts ohen merge wit h judgment in such a 
way Iha l a ny " ((empled separa lion is bOlh impossib le a nd undesirable." 2 DAV IS, § I S.03 a l 355. 
' 2 D An s, §1 2.0 1 a l 144. 
wREICIl. Til E LAW Of TilE PL'~~ED SOCIETY, 75 Va le L. J . 1227, 1242 (1966). 
"ELMAN. A N OTE ON Am llNlSTRA1W E ADJUDICATIO", 74 Va le L.J . 652, 653 ( 1965). 
" M cFARLAND, LA NDIS' R EPORT: Til E VOICE Of O NE CRYING IN Til E WI LDERNESS, 47 Va. L. Rev. 373, 433-35 (196 1). 
"366 F .2d 79S (91h C ir. 1966). 
"363 F .2d 757 (61h C ir . 1966). 
" 366 F .2d a l 802. 
"' Id. 
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based upon the depth of the investigation and the questions and comments 
by Mr. Dixon .... "1 7 Thus, previous contact with genera l facts , even where 
it might evidence some opinion as to such facts, does not constitute illega l 
prejudgment. 
C. Judicial Sensitivity to Bias as to Specific Facts 
An administrative agency must make its individual decisions based on 
the record in a particular proceeding. IS Whereas administrative officers may 
apply predetermined policy , or prior knowledge of general facts, they may 
not rely on determinations of specific facts reached or suggested outside the 
record of the individual proceeding. The guarantee of a hearing requires 
a practicable opportunity to persuade as well as to speak.19 Thus, the possi-
bility of bias as to specific facts must be closely examined. A comparison of 
the holdings in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC,20 and Skelly Oil v. Federal Power 
Commission 21 demonstra tes judicial sensitivity to ·allegations of bias as to 
specific facts . 
In Texaco, the FTC had issued complaints charging that Texaco had 
coerced its dealers into selling Goodrich tires , and that the underlying 
agreements between Texaco and Goodrich were unlawful. During the period 
of the hearing before the examiner, Chairman Dixon made a speech in which 
he named Texaco and Goodrich, among others, In close connection with a 
statement of practices alleged in the complaintY 
While conceding the Commissioner's right to hold certain views on 
general policy,23 the Court held that Chairman Dixon's speech indicated 
that he had formed opinions about the specific issues of the case before 
hearing the appeal. It found that " . . . a disinterested reader of Chairman 
Dixon 's speech could hardly fail to conclude that he had in some measure 
decided in advance that Texaco had violated the Act. " 24 
A different result on quite similar facts was reached by the Tenth 
Circuit in the Skelly case. There, the Federal Power Commission was to 
determine rates to be charged by a number of natural gas producers. The 
action was brought under section 5 of the Natural Gas Act25 which requires 
the Commission to find that a rate is " unjust , unreasonable , unduly dis-
criminatory, or preferential," before taking action. Prior to hearing before 
the Federal Power Commission, Commissioner Black made a speech in which 
he refuted the producers ' claim that competition, not regulation , should 
adjust rates . He stated, among other things, that the producers incorrectly 
urged the existence of competition and that " [the} producer 's plea that 
competition be given a free hand is simply another way of letting the pro-
1'363 F.2d at 768. 
"Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB . 340 U.S. 474 (1951 ); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park . Inc. et al. v. 
Volpe. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
19COMMEr'\T , PRE,I ll D ICE AND TilE Am.IINISTRATIVE PROGKt:SS,:; 9 N .W . L. RE\', 216, 216- 17 (1964 ). 
'°336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964 ). 
"375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967). 
"Texaco. 336 F.2d at 759. 
2)See discussion in Part A, Acceptance of Bias as to Genera l Policy a nd Lega l T heory. 
"Texaco. 336 F.2d at 760. 
"15 U.s.C. §717(d); 52 Stat. 823 (1938). 
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ducers fix the prices instead of the FPC." 
The Court held that the Commissioner's statement did not require that 
he be disqualified. It relied on the fact that he had not appeared to prejudge 
the ultimate issue of a "j ust and reasonable rate. " The Court went on to 
state: 
In our opinion no basis for disqualification arises from the fact or assumption 
tha t a member of an administrative agency enters a proceeding with advance views 
on important economic matters in issue .26 (Emphasis added.) 
Hence, the key factor which distinguishes this case from Texaco is that the 
FPC Commissioner's statements did not appear to prejudge specific facts in 
the proceeding but only general issues, i.e., " important economic matters. " 
Thus, it is not the "strong convictions" or "crystallized point of view" 
on questions of law, policy, or general facts which disqualify a decision-
maker, but rather evidence of opinions with respect to specific facts in a 
particular case before the agency for determination Y 
THE KEY FACTOR: THE CONTEXT OF THE DECISION MAKING 
Despite the apparent judicial sensitivity to whether the issue alleged 
to be prejudged might relate to specific facts , it is the premise of this article 
that the key distinction is whether the bias is institutional or personal. 
Courts will not find illegal prejudgment where the spectre of bias arises in 
the context of an institutional process, whereas the charge will result in close 
scrutiny of the decision where personal bias is alleged. 28 
The case most often cited in support of a prejudgment challenge is 
Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission. 29 In that case, 
one member of the Commission who had participated in the decision to 
authorize a proceeding had been director of the bureau conducting the in-
vestigation at issue during the time that it had initiated an informal investi-
gation. The Commissioner filed a statement that he was not prejudiced by 
his prior contact. However, the Court found that the statement evidenced 
involvement in the investigation. 30 The Court held due process requires, at 
least, "fair play" and that fairness demands that one who participated in the 
" Skelly, 375 F.2d at 18. 
" 2 DA VIS, §12 .01 , a t 130-34; American Cyanam id Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 764 -65 (6th Cir . 1966). 
The holding in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966), a lso hinges on a distinction between specific 
facts and general facts . Although nOl a prejudgment case , it does give further indication of judicial sensitivity to possible 
improper innuence on specific facts by considerations outside the record . Thus, a lthough the Court held that the Con-
gress has a right to advise as to the "sense of Congress" concerning the Commissioner's legislative function, it went on to 
state, " lhJowever , when [the congressiona lJ investigation focuses directly and substantially upon the mental decisional 
processes of a Commission in a case w hich is pending before it, Congress is no longer intervening in the agency's legis-
lative function , but rather , in its judicial function. " [d. at 964. Thus, the Court distinguished influence on such things as 
policy statements and rules from innuence on "adjudicative" facts, and found that the boundary had been passed in this 
particular congressional investigation . 
"cf 2 DAVIS § 11 .06, at 63-65. 
" 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
Wfhe same circuit on ly a year la ter severely limited the Amos Treat doctrine. In SEC v. R.A. Holman, 323 F.2d 
284 (D .C. Cir .), cerl. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963), respondent sought to disqua lify a Commissioner who had a position 
of responsibility on the staff but had not participated in the investigation . Presented with nearly the sa me fact situation, 
the Court limited Amos Treat to its particular fact s. It stated that Amos Trea t was an exceptional case and it found suffi· 
cient the Commissioner 's affidavit that he did not participate in the investigation. See Ma remon t Corp. v. FTC. 43 1 F.2d 
124, 128 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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case on the side of a party not participate in the decisionmaking.31 It found 
that the potential for prejudgment was too great where a Commissioner has 
been both the prosecutor and the judge. The Court concluded that " ... an 
administrative hearing of such importance and vast potential consequences 
must be attended, not only with every element of fairness but with the very 
appearance of complete fairness. "32 
The foundation case for the line of cases emanating from Amos Treat 
appears to be Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. National Labor Relations 
Board. 33 In Berkshire, a Board member had written a letter to a customer of 
the respondent which could be interpreted as soliciting his help in the union 
boycott. The Court recognized that an "administrative body" must perform 
certain duties which may prejudge issues in adjudication, but it found im-
proper the above conduct of a member of the tribunal. The Court concluded 
that "[ilf the circumstances alleged are proved Berkshire did not have a 
hearing before an impartial tribunal, but one in which one member of the 
body which made exceedingly important findings of fact had already thrown 
his weight on the other side. "34 
The leading case permitting preconception in administrative proceed-
ings is FTC v. Cement Institute. 35 The alleged prejudgment arose from an 
FTC Report to Congress on the cement industry which stated that the 
cement industry's multiple basing point system was price fixing. Petitioner 
charged that the FTC had engaged in investigation of facts outside the record 
of the adjudication, and had communicated to Congress certain conclusions 
which prejudged key issues in thL adjudication. The Court held that it could 
not bar the whole Commission from hearing a fact\lally related case because 
of expressed opinions formed as a result of its prior "official investigation." 
The Court based this holding on presumption of objectivity of the institution: 
"In the first place, the fact that the Commission had entertained such views 
as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean 
that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of re-
spondent's basing point practices. "36 In further support of its holding, it 
argued that to hold otherwise would mean that by carrying out its investiga-
tory function the Commission would immunize violators. "Thus experience 
acquired from their work as commissioners would be a handicap instead of 
an advantage."37 This experience is one of the Commission's valuable re-
sources, and hence, good reason compelled the Court to uphold the Commis-
sion action. 38 
"Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
"Amos Treat, 306 F.2d at 267. 
"121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941). 
" /d. at 239. 
"333 U.S. 683 (1948). 
" /d. at 701. 
"/d.at702 . 
}8 Also, a simultaneous industrywide investigation will not disable the agency from proceeding in adj udication 
against one industry member. Lehigh Portland Cement v. FTC, 291 F. Supp. 628 (D.E. D. Va. 1968), aij'd per curiam 
416 F.2d 971 (4 th Cir. 1969). 
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It could be argued that the Cement Institute is merely another case in 
which a court was willing to uphold the agency where only policy and gener-
a l facts may have been prejudged. However , in Pangburn v. CAB,39 the First 
Circuit rejected a challenge based upon prejudgment of specific facts . The 
CAB started two proceedings to investigate an airline crash : one to investi-
gate the crash and issue a public report, and another to determine whether 
to suspend the pilot 's license for fa ilure in skill. Prior to the conclusion of 
the suspension proceeding, the Board found that the crash was the result of 
pilot error. The pilot argued , quite plausibly, that the Board' s public find-
ings in the accident investigation prejudged the very issue in the adjudica-
tion. However, the court found for the Board : 
[W]e cannot say that the mere ract that a tribuna l has had contact with a 
particular ractua l complex in a prior hearing, or indeed has taken a public position 
on the racts , is enough to place tha t tribunal under a constitutiona l inhibition to 
pass upon the racts in a subseq uent hearing 4 0 
Thus, the court had little trouble with a situation in which the various 
institutional functions of the agency force it into a position fraught with the 
potentia l for bias-even as to specific facts . It relied on the integrity of 
institutiona l decisionmakers to assure " fair play" and cited 'a case in which 
the Board had , indeed , reached two different opinions.41 
The difference, then, between Berkshire and Amos Treat , and Cement 
Institute and Pangburn must be the nature of the decisionmaking. Thus, 
where individua l bias either exists or appears to exist the administrative 
action has not been upheld , but where institutional bias is suggested by the 
facts the action has been affirmed. 42 
A comparison of the first and second Cinderella43 cases demonstrates 
the efficacy of the institutional/ persona l distinction . In the first Cinderella 
case, the court explicitly relied on the institutional nature of a lleged preju-
dicial action relating to a specific case. The District Court had held that the 
Commission could not issue "reason to believe" press releases in connection 
with the initiation of an adjudication . One of its conclusions was that , " [t]he 
Commission has the duty in a quasi-judicial proceeding to avoid prejudgment 
or giving the appearance of having prejudged the issues involved in such 
proceedings . "44 
The Court of Appeals specifically rejected this holding. It found that it 
was the duty of the Commission to inform consumers of any information it 
became aware of which indicated unfa ir or deceptive practices. 
[T] here is in ract and law authority in the Commission , acting in the public 
interest , to a lert the public to suspected violations or the law by ractua l press re-
leases whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe tha t a respondent is 
" 31 1 F.2d 349 (1st Cir . 1962) . 
.ol d. at 358. 
'1 Id. at 356. 
-42 Even Amos Treat and Berkshire indirectly support the distinction; for t in both cases 1 the court left open the possi ~ 
bility of future proceedings by the same agency without the disqualified member. These courts trusted the institutions 
to right themselves and reach fair and untainted decisions. 
" FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing School, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (First Cinderella); Cindrrella 
Career & Fini shing School, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Second Cinderella). 
"Cinderell a Career & Finishing School, Inc. v. Federa l Trade Commission, 8 FTC Stal. & Dec. '470, 473 (D. D.C. 
1967). 
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engaged in activities made unlawful by the Act which have resulted in the initiation 
of action by the Commission.'; 
225 
In the second Cinderella case, Chairman Dixon made statements in a 
speech which indicated that he considered certain practices illegal but did 
not directly refer to the respondents. Typical of these statements is: " What 
about carrying ads that offer college educations in five weeks, ... or becom-
ing an airline's hostess by attending a charm school?"46 Basically, the Chair-
man had merely done what the first Cinderella case said the Commission 
had a duty to do: he was informing the public of questionable practices. 
Yet , the same Court chastised the individual agency member for his conduct. 
In recognitIOn of the institutional/ personal distinction, the Court 
stated that its affirmation of the Commission 's power to issue factual press 
releases "does not give individual Commissioners license to prejudge cases 
or to make speeches which give the appearance that the case has been pre-
judged. "47 Thus, the Court said: 
There is a marked difference between the issuance of a press release which 
states that the Commission has filed a complaint because it has 'reason to believe' 
tha t there have been violations, and statements by a Commissioner after an appeal 
has been filed which give the appearance that he has already prejudged the case and 
that the ultimate determination of the merits will move in predestined grooves. While 
these two si tuations-Commission press releases and a Commissioner 's pre-
decision public sta tements-are similar in appeara nce, they are obviously of a dif-
ferent order of merit .'8 (Emphasis added. ) 
Although an argument can be made that law of the second Cinderella case 
is questionable ,49 it has important doctrinal significance because of its ex-
plicit reliance on the institutional/ individual distinction. 50 
Nor is this doctrine limited to institutional decisions by a collegial 
body .51 Courts seem just as inclined to uphold an institutional decision of an 
individual decisionmaker reached in the performance of his duty. A factual 
situation similar to Amos Treat was upheld in Eisler v. United States. 52 
Eisler, an admitted communist, charged that the judge was biased because he 
had, as Assistant Attorney General, participated in anti-communist investi-
gations. The Court held that illegal prejudgment must be based on personal 
bias and such bias did not arise from the facts alleged. 53 Similarly, the 
"First Cinderella at 1314. 
"Second Cmderella at 590. 
Hid. 
" Id. 
4<)The primary thrust of the Court 's opi nion, in fact, concerned the appearance of prejudgment rather than pre-
judgment itse lf. The holding may be explained by reference to the fact that other similar cases were few in number and 
had occurred several years in the past. This fact , along wit h the close proximity of the speech (Q the Court 's decision in 
the first Cinderella, confirmed the Court's view that" ... the reasonable inference a disinterested observer would give 
these remarks would connect them inextricably with this case." Second Cinderella, at 590 n.IO. The Court seems to have 
stretched the appearance test to include an inference of prejudgment of specific facts rather than the orthodox applica-
tion of the test to g lean the appearance of a fair hearing or impartia l mind . 
IOThe distinction was recently recognized in Kennecoll Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972). In that 
case the Court said that a charge that correspondence from the Commission itself with Congress made a fair hearing im· 
possible went to "the nature of the law itseW' and could not be upheld . Id. at 79. However, it did indicate that expres-
sions by an individual Commissioner which evidenced prejudgment of controverted issues , although not found in this case , 
would lead to disqualification. Id. at 80. 
" Bul see 2 DAVIS §11 .01. 
"170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir .), cerl. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1948). 
Sl id. at 278. 
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Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp . et al.54 refused to dis-
qualify Judge Wyzanski for preliminary findings in hearing statements which 
appeared contrary to the defendant's position . In doing so, it relied on the 
fact that the opinions were related to the Judge 's institutiona l duties and 
hence were not the result of extraneous personal bias. 55 Administrative 
agencies need meet no greater standard than judges,56 and hence, the hold-
ings of these two cases apply equally as well to agency decisions Y 
Indeed, similar reliance on the institutionalized decisionmaker has been 
expressed with respect to individual administrative officers . In National 
Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment CO. ,58 the hearing examiner 
had excluded testimony in the initial hearing in the case. After a court held 
that the testimony should have been heard and returned the case to the 
agency, the same examiner, after hearing the testimony, found as he had 
before. In reliance on the integrity of the institutional decisionmaker , the 
Court upheld the examiner 's decision and rejected the challenge of illega l 
prejudgment. In MacKay v. McAlexander,59 the same hearing officer who 
presided at the deportation hearing was held qualified to preside at the hear-
ing on suspension of deportation .60 The SlIpreme Court , in United States v. 
Morgan, 61 relied on the institutional nature of the individual administrative 
officer's decision . The case arose from a letter written by the Secretary of 
Agriculture to the N ew York Times strongly criticizing a court decision on a 
matter which was again before the Secretary. The potential for prejudgment 
was clear, but the Court upheld the Secretary's second decision. In so doing, 
the Court said " [ t 1 hat he not merely held , but expressed, strong views on 
matters believed by him to have been in issue, did not unfit him for exercising 
his duty . . . . "62 The Court assumed that in reaching an institutional de-
cision in performance of his duty he would do so impartially, i.e., the pre-
sumption of regularity in institutional decisions. 
Accordingly, official administrative action will withstand challenges 
based on bias or the opportunity for bias so long as the decision is made in 
the context of an institutional function . This conclusion is not affected by 
whether the institutional decisionmaker is collegial or singular. 
Two reasons are given for rejecting prejudgment challenges against an 
" 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
" Id. at 583. 
" e.g., NLRB v. Donnell y Garment Co. , 330 U.S. 219 , 236-37 (194 7); FTC v. Cement Institute , 333 U.S. 683,703 
(1948). 
S70ften cited in support of cha llenges of bias by administrative age ncies is the decision in In re Murchinson, 349 
U .S. 133 (1955). That case involved a trial judge who found two witnesses in contempt in open court for prior statements 
made in a grand jury. The Supreme Court held that the tria l judge could not be the complainant , indicter , prosecutor 
and judge: " Having been a part of tha t laccusatory I process a judge ca nnot be , in the very nature of things, wholly dis-
interested in the conviction or acquitta l of these accused." /d. a t 137. But where the fac ts were not as aggravated the 
Supreme Court refused to find bias in a contempt conviction by a tr ia l judge. Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 
(1957); Sacher et a l. v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) . Moreover , the very na ture of the administrative process com-
pels agencies to perform dual functions, and hence, the rationale of Murchinson seems tota lly inapplicable to adminis-
trative agencies. 
" 330 U.S. 219 (1947). 
" 268 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1959), cerl. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960). 
"'Id. at 39. 
" 313 U.S. 409 (1941 ). 
" Id. at 421. 
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institutiona l decisionmaker. 63 The major reason is judicial reliance on the 
integrity of institutiona l decisionmakers . The courts presume that institu-
tional decisionmakers will fairly operate the multiface ted administrative 
systems which are often fr aught with opportunities for improper bias. Thus, 
in Cement Institute, the Supreme Court said, " ... the fact that the Com-
mlSSlOn has entertained such views as the result of its prior ex parte investi-
gations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members are irre-
vocably closed on the subject. ... "64 In Pangburn ,65 even though the Board 
had previously expressed an opinion on the specific issue raised in the 
adjudication, the Court found that the Board would not consider itself bound 
by that opinion but would feel free to reach a contradictory opinion in the 
adjudication . The second, and less importa nt, reason for such decisions is 
the " rule of necessity. "66 Hence, in Pangburn, after finding reason for 
placing its trust in the Board , the Court went on to say, " [i 1 f we were to 
accept petitioner 's argument [that the accident .investiga tion disqua lified 
the Board from considering suspension], it would mean that because the 
Board obeyed the mandate of Section 701 , it was thereupon constitutiona lly 
precluded from carrying out its responsibilities under Section 609 ."67 
Even though courts have gone quite far to uphold official agency action , 
they have on occasion indicated that their tolerance has some boundaries. 
In several cases, the courts have indicated a strong aversion to clear indica-
tions of actual prejudgment in official agency action . In Gilligan, Will &-
Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,68 the SEC had issued a press 
release three days after initiation of an adjudication announcing that it had 
found that the exact factual situation in issue in the adjudication was illegal 
(as opposed to announcing a " reason to believe"). While refusing to over-
turn the Commission's action, the Court said : 
. . . the Commission's reputation for objectivity and impartia lity is opened to 
cha llenge by the adoption of a procedure from which a disinterested observer may 
conclude that it has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a par-
. ticular case in advance of hearing it. There would appear to be no such conflict be-
tween the Commission's duty to inform the public and its duty to prosecute as would 
necessitate the use of press releases of the kind here questioned [finding a viola-
tion] .69 
Similarly, even though the Court in L ehigh Portland Cement v. FTOo 
clearly upheld the FTC's right to consider the same issues in two different 
proceedings (citing Pangburn71 ), it reserved the right of judicial review if it 
appeared, after the agency's action became final , that actual bias was 
present. 72 In making this suggestion, the Court may have been merely enter-
"e.g., Cement Institute, p. 223 supra . 
" 333 U.S. at 70 1. 
" 3 11 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962). 
" 2 DAVIS §12 .04; e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute , 333 U.S. a t 701 ; Pangburn v. CAB, 3 11 F .2d 349 (1st Cir. 1 962); 
Loughran et a l. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 431 , 433 (8th Cir . 1944). 
67311 F.2d at 358. 
"267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). 
" Id. at 468-69 . 
' "29 1 F. Supp. 628 (D.E. D.Va . 1968), aff'dpercuriam , 416 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1 969) . 
" Supra . 
" 291 F. Supp. at 633 . 
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ing the narrow groove cut by the Court in San Francisco Mining Exchange v. 
SEC: 73 
It may be that the Commission members in deciding this case on the merits , 
made use of the staff report and other information that may have been brought to 
their attention a t the time they were ca lled upon to determine if the proceeding 
should be instituted . However, absent any factual basis for believing that the Com-
mission made such use of these materials, as is the case here, an inquiry into the 
state of mind of administrative adjudicators during the decisional process is wholly 
improper71 
Thus, the potential exists that a court may, at least , entertain a challenge of 
prejudgment in official agency action upon the difficult and unlikely showing 
of actual bias. Otherwise , such challenges should no longer be seriously con-
sidered . 
CONCLUSION 
Insofar as predispositions may exist in the more highly charged field s in which 
administrative agencies operate, they are mainly the product of many factors of 
mind and experience, and have comparativel y little relation to the administrative 
machinery. There is no simple way of eliminating them by mere change in the 
administrative structure . They can only be exorcised by wise and self-controlled 
men. The problem is inherently one of personnel and the traditions in which it is 
trained. 75 
Courts faced with the problems of administrative prejudgment would 
seem to concur in the above finding of the Attorney General's Committee 
to Study Administrative Procedure. For , where the decision is institu-
tionalized , the courts have relied on the integrity of the men involved to 
do "the right thing." 
" 378 F.2d 162 (9th Gir. 1967). 
" ld. at 168 . 
7SFINAL R EPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMI NI STRATI VE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. No. 8, 77th 
Gong., 1st Sess. at 59 (194 1). 
